Brunei’s two-step approach to the south china sea – war on the rocks

_Editor’s Note: A version of this article was originally published by _The Interpreter_, which is published by the _Lowy Institute_, an independent, nonpartisan think tank based in Sydney. 

_War on the Rocks_ is proud to be publishing select articles from _The Interpreter_._ On July 20, after a long period silence on the issue, the Brunei Darussalam Ministry of Foreign Affairs

issued a statement declaring that it “maintains its two-step approach in addressing the South China Sea.” As bland as this statement sounds, it represents a critical development in the tiny

sultanate’s views on the region and a rising China. Brunei’s two-step approach indicates that while the mechanism for conflict resolution is bilateral and adherent to the 1982 U.N.

Convention for the Law of the Sea, it also stresses the importance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-China code of conduct. But putting aside the details, there is

symbolism in the fact that Brunei chose to speak at all. The statement comes after a series of pronouncements made by the Philippines, China, the United States, and Vietnam on their

positions on the South China Sea. Furthermore, the 36th ASEAN Summit under Vietnam’s leadership emphasized the need to address the challenges in the region and reaffirm the ASEAN outlook on

the Indo-Pacific. Brunei has claims to Louisa Reef, Owen Shoal, and Rifleman Bank, all of which Brunei declared in 1984 as features in its exclusive economic zone. However, Brunei is the

only country among the claimant states that does not assert sovereignty over these islands, nor does it have any military presence there. The statement makes clear that the long-silent

claimant has spoken. But how loudly will it be heard in the region and beyond? For decades, the tiny sultanate state has relied on oil reserves to sustain itself and the ruling monarchy. As

its domestic reserves are not enough to sustain the country in the coming decades, however, Brunei must find new ways to secure its economy. China has launched a “charm offensive” to take

advantage of Brunei’s declining economy through channeling investments and infrastructure projects in the country. “In exchange for US$6 billion of Chinese investment into an oil refinery

and local infrastructure, along with promises to boost trade and agricultural cooperation,” China has effectively managed to buy Brunei’s silence on the South China Sea — until now. Brunei’s

statement seems to present a unified front with the Philippines and Vietnam, in preparation for its ASEAN chairmanship in 2021, where ASEAN and China hope to finalize the formulation of the

code of conduct to reduce tensions in the South China Sea. However, Brunei’s insistence that specific issues in the maritime region should be addressed bilaterally syncs with Beijing’s

position, indicating that the country is still dependent on Chinese investment. As the second-wealthiest member of ASEAN in per capita terms, it is paramount for Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah to

maintain the economic status quo to ensure the stability of the sultanate. Everything revolves around the sultan in Brunei. The Bruneian people subscribe to the _Melayu Islam Beraja_, the

Malay Islamic Monarchy, as their political identity. As a result, Brunei’s strategic culture is infused with the notion that everything, including the determination of threats, is gauged by

the sultan. The most recent security effort of Brunei is the 2011 defense white paper, which assesses that the region is becoming more unstable, with major powers rebalancing their role and

influence. With respect to the South China Sea, Brunei views a collective approach as necessary to secure maritime traffic amid unresolved boundaries, growing naval capabilities and

major-power competition. With one of the weakest Southeast Asian military forces, in terms of both size and capability, Brunei seeks to work cooperatively with other states, rather than

confronting geostrategic challenges. The pursuit of a collective approach speaks to Brunei’s preference for neutrality and constructiveness to increase its international reputation. However,

with today’s strategic environment, Brunei sees the need to endorse China’s proposal for bilateral cooperation in resolving certain issues in the South China Sea thanks to Beijing’s charm

offensive. This development has made a discrepancy between Brunei’s defense and foreign policies. The white paper is out of date and out of step with the current political environment. At

the time of its creation, the leading defense and security concerns were terrorism and environmental disasters, not rising geopolitical competition. Today, however, what matters in their

contribution to international peace and security efforts reaches far beyond their backyard. A longstanding special relationship with the United Kingdom has significantly affected Bruneian

strategic culture. After Brunei’s independence in 1984, the British modestly maintained a light infantry battalion in the country, with a few army air corps squadrons in place at the request

of the sultan. Through a memorandum of understanding, renewed every five years, Brunei enjoys British presence for goodwill visits, training, exercises and education. The British presence

in Brunei has strategic value, especially with the rising tensions in the South China Sea. Undermining Bruneian interests would potentially provoke the British to be more present in the

region. In other words, if Chinese gray-zone tactics persist in the Bruneian exclusive economic zone, then the British likely will have more reason to conduct regular freedom-of-navigation

operations in the South China Sea. The Brunei statement reflects the country’s complicated — and possibly conflicted — strategic outlook. It wants to present itself as a trustworthy member

of ASEAN, while also keeping its robust economic relations with China. At the same time, it is also secured by the British presence in the area, which, with the threat of tipping over into a

wider conflict, acts as a deterrent to China. The meaning of the statement is important to consider as Brunei looks to take regional leadership with the ASEAN chairmanship in 2021.

Moreover, the launch of its long-overdue defense white paper in 2021 will project just how Brunei intends to position itself in Southeast Asia in line with its strategic objectives. With of

the arrival of the white paper, it may be anticipated that Brunei’s foreign and defense policies will synchronize in time for its ASEAN chairmanship. _Joshua Espeña is a Manila-based defense

analyst who writes and works on great power politics in the Indo-Pacific, Philippine strategic culture, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations studies. _ _Anne Uy is a researcher with

interests in the South China Sea, Southeast Asia affairs, and Cross-Strait relations. She is currently pursuing her masters in political science at De La Salle University._ Image: U.S. Navy

(Photo by Mass Communication Spc. 2nd Class Christopher Veloicaza)