Remembering history so not to repeat it | thearticle

George Santyana said that “those who do not remember history are doomed to repeat it.” He might have added that remembering your own history is not enough: you also have to know the history

that your adversary remembers. One of the writers of this article is a native Iranian who lived through the revolution — the other is a sometime US intelligence officer. Both of us

understand that effective US policy has to be based on seeing the world through Iran’s eyes, not to justify Iran’s actions, but to understand them. Nothing knits a country together like

insults to national pride, and that holds particularly true for Iran, an ancient and proud civilisation. It is thus worth remembering the pivotal moments in the US-Iran relationship through

Iranian eyes. The 1953 coup that toppled democratically-elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, in order to strengthen the rule by the Shah was what it was — direct US intervention in

Iran’s internal affairs. Over the years, many Iranians who then opposed the Shah have changed their political views and forgiven him. What is not forgotten, or forgiven, is the US direct

interference to interrupt the country’s transition to democracy, a struggle that continues to this day. A generation later, Iranian revolutionary students remembered, rightly, that the coup

against Mosaddegh had been orchestrated from the US embassy. This became the revolutionaries’ justification for their attack on the embassy and the hostage crisis. Iranians also remember,

again with considerable justification, that Saddam Hussein was encouraged by the US to attack Iran in 1980, an event that galvanised national support for the revolutionary regime just as it

was passing through dark hours. For many Iranians, this was another US betrayal in their country’s transition to democracy. They may not support their government and its anti-US sentiments,

yet they share their government’s distrust of the United States. Small wonder that Iranians trust the US even less that Americans trust the Islamic Republic. The collective support for Iraq

by the US, Europe, Israel, and most countries in the region has made the Iranian government see itself as alone in a hostile region and an antagonistic world. Politically isolated, with the

economy in ruins and morale low as a result of eight years of brutal war, the Islamic Republic tried to make peace with the global community. President Mohamad Khatami’s initiative for the

United Nations Year of Dialogue Among Civilisations, in 2001, was a clear indication of this. Iranians also remember as Americans do not, that Iran was America’s partner in the war on terror

in the wake of 9/11. For its pains, Iran was placed in the US axis of evil. Against this backdrop, the Islamic Republic sought survival by reshaping the strategic balance in the region. The

result is a creative grouping, labelled as the “axis of resistance” or “axis of terror” depending on which side you are aligned with. It links Iran to militia and non-state but influential

forces, all united in their opposition to Nato, and Israeli and Saudi Arabian activities in the region. Today, it has expanded to include the Syrian Assad government, the Lebanese militant

group Hezbollah, pro-Syrian government militias, Iraqi Shia militias, and the Yemeni Houthi. Nuclear technology also came to be seen by the hardliners as an existential matter. Fatwas from

both supreme leaders proscribed nuclear weapons as non-Islamic, but Iraq’s use of chemical weapons convinced the hardliners that obtaining nuclear technology was a necessity for regime

survival. Still, under US economic and political pressure and the influence of reformists at home, Iran entered an agreement to halt the programme. When Trump breezily walked away from that

agreement, it was taken as evidence that the reformists had been naive in dealing with the United States. The hardliner narrative is that Washington envisions a “New Middle East” with Iran

divided into small and weak countries. Agreements only buy time while the big assault is prepared. The bottom line, according to them, is a historic reminder that America should never be

trusted. The recent escalating crisis and the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, a senior official in a recognised government and respected leader in fighting Isis, adds a new layer to this

troubled history. For sure, Soleimani’s assassination, seen as yet more US interference, won’t be forgotten by Iranians, nor forgiven by hardliners and their regional allies, especially

while Khamenei is alive. Beyond the current calculated minimal response, we have to wait and see when and how retaliation will come. If history is any indication, the response will be

carefully considered, strategic, surprising, and indirect. Paradoxically, today, Iran and the United States find themselves in a similar position — deeply distrustful of one another, yet

eager to negotiate. Both want to arrive at the negotiating table from a position of strength. Iran wants to see the United States out of the region while maintaining its own influence. It

blames US-sponsored sanctions for the economic travails it is suffering. To achieve its aims, Iran realises it has no other option but to engage in an intense negotiation with the United

States. For Trump, leaving the Middle East not only ties in nicely with his “America First” policy, but making a deal may also be the perfect match for his election agenda. He justified

Soleimani’s assassination as necessary to avoid a major attack on US forces, but has provided no credible evidence to support this claim. The most logical explanation is that facing an

upcoming election with nothing major to show, Trump may have thought a deal with Iran could be the winning card. His deal-making instinct and gambling impulse may have convinced him that the

assassination of Iran’s charismatic regional leader would not only undercut Iran’s position in the region, but also frighten Iran to the negotiating table from a weakened position. However,

Iran has played its weak hand masterfully and turned the defeat to opportunity; after all, chess was invented in ancient Persia. Late last year, Iran was at its most vulnerable, facing

internal demonstrations and regional protests against its presence in the region. The regime used the assassination and funeral to build unity at home and fuel anti-American sentiments. It

also showed that the US threat was real; Iran was the victim, but also the one that stands up to the power. It was also a reminder that the Iranians should support the government if they do

not want to suffer the same fate as Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Iranians will be watching the impeachment process, monitoring the global reaction to Trump’s Israeli-Palestinian “peace

deal”, assessing the president’s electability and appetite for an agreement before making any decision about negotiations. Considering that Trump faces a tight timeline to meet by November

2020, suddenly, his “Art of the Deal” doesn’t seem so artful.