As Putin and Xi meet, should we beware of a new Moscow-Beijing Axis?

Until the 1930s, the word “axis” was an innocent term used mainly in geometry and geology. Then, in 1936, Hitler and Mussolini signed a treaty that was quickly dubbed the “Rome-Berlin Axis”

— implying that the rest of Europe would in future turn on the relationship between the Fascist powers. Japan later became the third power to join what became known simply as “the Axis”,

especially after 1941 when all three fought against the Allies.

In 2002, George W. Bush spoke of an “axis of evil” between the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq (then still ruled by Saddam Hussein) and North Korea: three rogue states that actively sponsored

terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Yet though there were clandestine connections between these three (and also others, such as Syria and Libya), there were no treaties

or other agreements between them. By the time President Bush reintroduced it into political discourse, the word “axis” had acquired such sinister connotations as to require no evidence of a

formal alliance to capture the imagination of the West.

This week, there is once again talk of a new “axis”, this time an axis of autocrats. President Vladimir Putin is making a rare foreign visit to Beijing, ostensibly to mark the opening of the

Winter Olympics, being held this month in China. Putin is also expected to sign some 15 trade deals with President Xi Jinping, including a project to build a second “Spirit of Siberia” gas

pipeline to supply the insatiable Chinese economy. But this summit is likely to be about much more than energy, trade and sport.

Putin and Xi have a certain amount in common: both lead authoritarian states with imperial ambitions and a history of hostility to the United States and its allies. More precisely, both

Russia and China are expansionist states with unsatisfied territorial ambitions — most obviously in Ukraine and Taiwan respectively. In public, the two leaders are expected to make common

cause on the present crisis in Europe. In private, they will be discussing how to circumvent Western sanctions, including the possible exclusion of Russia from Swift, the international

banking payments system.

Whether the Moscow-Beijing axis will evolve into a military alliance is less certain. Here, a little history may be helpful. Two years after Hitler and Mussolini created their Axis, which

was largely symbolic, Nazi Germany annexed Austria, which had been a bone of contention with Italy. Mussolini also raised no objection to Hitler’s dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Only in

1939, as war became inevitable, did the Axis powers sign a “Pact of Steel”, promising mutual military assistance — though this alliance was overshadowed by the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact

between Germany and the Soviet Union, which sealed the fate of Poland.

When Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany, Italy remained neutral. Mussolini only joined in once France had been defeated in 1940, later embroiling his German ally in unwelcome

conflicts in North Africa and Yugoslavia. Japan waited until 1941 to launch its attack on the United States, which was still a neutral power, invading British colonies at the same time.

Hitler’s declaration of war on the US in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, in solidarity with his Japanese ally, was as unexpected as it was catastrophic for Germany. While it may have been a

diplomatic trophy, from a military perspective the Axis proved to be more of a burden than an asset for Nazi Germany, its strongest member.

In the case of Russia and China, an axis would rest on even flimsier foundations. The two authoritarian powers undoubtedly share certain characteristics and even policies, such as the brutal

suppression of civil liberties and human rights, shading into the genocidal treatment of Muslim ethnic groups in Chechnya and Xinjiang. But the Chinese surveillance state is far more

repressive towards even the majority population than its Russian counterpart. There is no shared ideology; unlike the People’s Republic, Russia is not (yet) a one-party state. And the

Chinese economy is, depending on which measure one uses, five or six times bigger than the Russian, with this and other disparities growing all the time. Chinese GDP is currently growing

roughly six times faster and Russia is one of the few major economies to have an even worse demographic outlook than China.

Putin’s greatest asset is, of course, Russia’s mineral resources, to which China needs access and over the price of which the two leaders are likely to haggle. The same applies to the former

Soviet states in Central Asia, which Moscow regards as part of its sphere of influence but which Beijing has groomed through the Belt and Road system. The New Year uprising in Kazakhstan

showed both how the Sino-Russian relationship functions, but also the pitfalls ahead.

Popular unrest over soaring energy prices, accompanied by a power struggle in the regime, was crushed by Russian intervention under the auspices of the CSTO, the military alliance of former

Soviet republics and satellites. The official death toll is 227; nearly 10,000 protesters were arrested. China remained aloof, on condition that the CSTO withdrew its forces after restoring

order; that has now taken place. But the episode highlighted the extent of the shift in the balance of power in Central Asia, which is now a duopoly rather than a patchwork of Russian

satrapies. China is now not only the main market but the biggest investor in the region. Nothing happens there now without consultations between Putin and Xi.

The other card that Putin has to play is military. Russia remains one of the world’s two great nuclear powers, along with the US, while China is far behind. But as American high tech becomes

harder to buy or even steal, the Kremlin needs access to Chinese know-how. Both powers have so far been cautious about sharing military technology, but in some areas, such as hypersonic

missiles, they have both stolen a march on the US. The potential for joint projects and synergies in areas such as AI is obviously there, though the Chinese would inevitably be the dominant

partner.

How worried should the West be about this emerging Sino-Russian axis? Roger Boyes, writing in the Times (behind a paywall), compares the strategic situation to George Orwell’s Nineteen

Eighty-Four, in which the world is divided into three blocs: Oceania (led by the US and UK), Eurasia (led by Russia) and xx, led by China. His suggests that “Oceania” (shorthand for a

combination of NATO and the Anglosphere) is suffering a “vacuum of leadership”, which both the authoritarian blocs are hoping to exploit.

Boyes has a point: seen from Moscow or Beijing, American politics looks geriatric and Europe is hopelessly divided. As Sir Richard Dearlove, the former director of MI6, argued here in

TheArticle this week, Germany is crucial to the Ukrainian crisis because its national interests, for historical and practical reasons, diverge significantly from those of Britain and the US

in relation to Russia. Germany also has a more ambiguous attitude to China than its Anglophone allies.

As far as the EU is concerned, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, has been seeking to fill the vacuum of leadership, making overtures to Putin about new security structures — and

arousing suspicions in Washington and London. The question of how Russia and China could cooperate to deepen and capitalise on these divisions, both within Europe and with the Atlantic

powers, may loom large in the Putin-Xi talks this week. The West should not be intimidated by the putative Moscow-Beijing Axis. But neither should we assume that a new climate of

Sino-Russian convergence will be without grave consequences for global peace. There is no honour among thieves and despots, but their common complicity in unspeakable crimes makes them

formidable adversaries of humanity.

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