As biden woos boris, what next for british foreign policy? | thearticle

The new Biden administration is in a hurry. That may be because at 78, the oldest President in US history does not know if he will be in a position to run again in four years. But it is also

because Biden has to unpick the havoc, domestic and international, bequeathed by Donald Trump. While Biden’s immediate domestic priority is vaccinating 100 million Americans in 100 days,

his speech at the State Department on February 4 announced a new era of US foreign policy, built on pragmatism, diplomacy and multilateralism. The decision to rejoin the World Health

Organisation and the Paris climate accord on his first day in office indicates this new approach, in stark contrast to the belligerent unilateralism of his predecessor. But the longer-term

strategic issue — which Trump correctly identified — is China. That reality has forced Biden to take another look at Britain. He had dismissed Boris Johnson (whom he has never met) as a

“physical and emotional clone” of the erstwhile incumbent of his office, but he phoned the British PM before any other European leader. At the time of the Brexit referendum, the then Vice

President and those around him regarded the UK’s departure from the EU as an egregious act of self-harm and inimical to US interests. But the recent decision by the EU to sign the

Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China, to lubricate commerce between the two, has caused consternation in Washington. That has provided an opportunity for the UK to cosy up to the

US, which is seeking allies to develop a common approach towards the rapidly rising Asian superpower. It should be built upon three pillars: containment, cooperation and confrontation. The

British Government, which has radically changed its approach to China in the past two years, understands this. Hence the decision to completely remove Huawei from the 5G network by 2027 and

to grant a path to citizenship to up to three million Hong Kong residents, who are living under the thumb of a repressive Chinese state.  However, an independent Britain outside the EU may

also provide other opportunities. It has, for example, enabled the UK to approve vaccines earlier than the EU, using its own regulatory body. Contracts with multiple vaccine suppliers were

also secured months ago, much to the chagrin of the European Commission, which has proved tardier in procurement and clumsily sought to restrict vaccine exports to Northern Ireland, before

hastily backing down. The UK has also secured over 30 trade deals with countries outside Europe, many of them replicating the benefits it previously enjoyed with these states when it was a

member of the EU. While London should work with Brussels to ensure that non-tariff barriers to trade are minimised, as the EU accounts for almost 50 per cent of UK trade flows, the

Government is also looking further afield. That is why Liz Truss, the Secretary of State for International Trade, wishes to join CPTPP, a trade agreement between Asia Pacific states

providing access to a market of 500 million people, although British exports to the region currently only account for roughly 9 per cent of the UK total. The desire to increase trade with

the rest of the world is compounded by strategic strengths in Britain’s favour. One is that it is less dependent on Russian gas than many European states, notably Germany. According to the

consultancy Wood MacKenzie, in 2018 Russian gas accounted for under 2 per cent of total gas imports to the UK. For Germany, the figure is believed to be closer to 35 per cent. That

dependence is evident as the Russians scramble to complete the $11 billion NordStream2 project, in the face of increasingly punitive US sanctions. The pipeline will transport Russian gas via

the Baltic seabed, landing in Greifswald. Dealing with an increasingly authoritarian Kremlin — which is prepared to crush dissent, as exemplified by the attempted murder and subsequent

incarceration of Alexei Navalny — requires robust statecraft and a commonality of approach. Hence the Prime Minister’s proposal for a “D10” grouping of global democracies is timely. Boris

Johnson is intending to host this meeting at Carbis Bay in Cornwall in June, to include G7 states as well as South Korea, India and Australia. Discussions will almost certainly include

possible alternatives to China’s dominance in 5G, as well as the fragility and reliability of international supply chains, which have been exposed during the pandemic. But there are urgent

questions for this newly global Britain. What philosophy, if any, will guide international intercourse? Will the UK return to notions of an “ethical foreign policy”, as espoused by Robin

Cook in 1997, when he became Foreign Secretary under New Labour? Or will Britain be guided by the pragmatism of Lord Palmerston? In 1848 the then Foreign Secretary (and later Prime Minister)

famously told the House of Commons: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”

Early indications are that the Government prefers hard-headed realism to hostages to fortune. That explains its resistance to the insertion of a clause in the Trade Bill which would allow

the High Court to determine if a genocide was taking place in a country with which the UK was seeking to agree a trade deal. Realpolitik involves holding one’s nose at times. However, it

does not mean a failure to speak out against state-sanctioned persecution of particular communities — as is the case with the Uighurs is Xinjiang. For this crime against humanity, the

Foreign Secretary has strongly condemned Beijing. There is also the question of what “global Britain” means for levelling up. A vision of “Singapore-on-Thames” may appeal to liberal-minded

free marketeers, but it is unlikely to reassure working-class voters, particularly in “Red Wall” constituencies. Many of those who have seen their wages depressed by an influx of cheap

labour in recent years may instinctively favour a more protectionist approach that insulates them from the harshness of global competition, particularly in the face of a pandemic-induced

recession.  Boris Johnson will have to balance all these considerations in determining his approach. The decisions he and his Government make on the international stage will have

repercussions in the domestic arena and ultimately for the future electoral success of his party.  A MESSAGE FROM THEARTICLE _We are the only publication that’s committed to covering every

angle. We have an important contribution to make, one that’s needed now more than ever, and we need your help to continue publishing throughout the pandemic. So please, make a donation._