Book review of "free world: why a crisis of the west reveals the opportunity of our time"

Book Review of \"Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of Our Time\" | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace _Garton Ash's account of

Britain's position, and the responses adopted to their national dilemma by British citizens, is the strongest part of his book. He is particularly good at demolishing myths, such as the

re-creation of Churchill by the British and American Right as an anti-European Atlanticist._  published by _The Tablet_ (London)  on September 18, 2004 PROGRAM RUSSIA AND EURASIA The Russia

and Eurasia Program continues Carnegie’s long tradition of independent research on major political, societal, and security trends in and U.S. policy toward a region that has been upended by

Russia’s war against Ukraine.  Leaders regularly turn to our work for clear-eyed, relevant analyses on the region to inform their policy decisions. Learn More _Source: The Tablet (London)_

I would very much like to believe in the core message of Timothy Garton Ash's latest book, Free World: that a renewed and strengthened Euro-Atlantic partnership is possible, as part of

a wider movement to bring democracy and freedom to the whole world. That such a partnership is desirable is beyond question.  A complete collapse of the European-American alliance, involving

"the end of the West" as a meaningful ideological and geopolitical concept, would be a disaster for humanity. Garton Ash's book takes its point of departure from the dilemma

of "Janus Britain", caught between the conflicting imperatives of cooperation with the European Union and with the United States. His account of Britain's position, and the

responses adopted to their national dilemma by British citizens, is the strongest part of his book. He is particularly good at demolishing myths, such as the re-creation of Churchill by the

British and American Right as an anti-European Atlanticist.  Garton Ash's conclusion is that Britain simply cannot choose between the United States and Europe: that the divisions in

British society on this issue are so profound, and reflect such old, strong British traditions, that a definitive choice one way or the other is out of the question. Whether we like it or

not, Britain is doomed to go on trying to provide a bridge between the United States and Europe and to seek a stronger role both in the European Union and in cooperation with the United

States. Of course, as Garton Ash also argues very cogently, "Europe" and "America" are anything but opposed monolithic cultural blocs. Under Clinton, many Europeans may

have had numerous problems with American international policies, but they did not feel that the President himself embodied an alien political and moral culture. America after all has one of

the oldest, most powerful liberal traditions in the world, intimately related to those of Britain and western Europe. Today, a great many Americans are bitterly alienated by both the

policies and the culture represented by George Bush and the dominant forces in his administration. There is nonetheless every chance that he will be re-elected in November. If so, this will

be a black day for American democracy and its image in the world, for it will be thanks in large part to an election campaign of quite exceptional coarseness and sheer mendacity on the part 

of the Republicans.  It will also be a black day for the American-European relationship, for some of the American groups most strongly represented in this administration possess cultures

which while certainly not characteristic of a majority of Americans, are radically alien to the dominant culture of contemporary Europe. This is especially true of the overlapping worlds of 

fundamentalist Christianity and radical American nationalism. But of course, Bush's re-election, though extremely damaging if it happens, will not be the end of the story. There is even

an argument that it could be for the best in the long term for the Republicans to have to take responsibility for the consequences of their actions. In this case, there is more chance that

a Democrat victory in 2008 or 2012 could lead to a true generational shift in American politics and political culture. In this case, the prospects for long-term trans-Atlantic cooperation

would look considerably brighter. So, like Garton Ash, I continue to hope. But hope, alas, is not the same as analysis. When Garton Ash describes the real chances in the short-to-medium term

of Britain acting as a bridge, and of renewed co-operation between the United States and Europe, if only we wish for this strongly enough, the quality of his analysis declines sharply. His

tone meanwhile assumes a kind of brave but desperate Blairite chirpiness, like the ragtime played on that great Anglo-American institution the Titanic.  This is above all true of the two

most important issues facing the United States and Europe today, namely global warming and the threat of Islamist terrorism. On neither is there much real chance of the kind of shift in 

American attitudes and power structures which would bring the United States much closer to Europe. I fear that it will take many years and many disasters for this to change. On the question

of the war on terror and relations with the Muslim world, Garton Ash's hopefulness leads him very largely to ignore the greatest obstacle to European support for the United States in

the region, namely the role of Israel and America's support for Israel. This is not just a matter of the effect of Israeli policies on Muslim public opinion. The Israeli lobby in the US

has also played the central role in preventing any rational American policy towards Iran and Syria. To judge by the election campaign, this is likely to continue under a Democrat

administration -especially if the Republicans go on controlling Congress. The deep hostility of the rulers of these countries to al-Qaida-style Sunni extremism has given the United States

tremendous opportunities to rally Muslim support. It is wantonly, criminally, throwing this opportunity away. In consequence, it is extremely difficult for intelligent and well-informed

European leaders to have any real confidence in US leadership in this region; and without such confidence, how can they ask their publics to make sacrifices and run risks in support of

American strategy?  It must also be stated that even where European and other countries have supported the US in Iraq, for example, with the sole exception of Britain their contributions

have been pathetic. Even Britain's much greater contribution has brought Blair limited visible influence and many all too visible snubs and humiliations. It has sometimes seemed that he

has bought a place at America's "top table" by becoming an American cabinet minister and accepting cabinet discipline - rather like Colin Powell. An argument can indeed be

made that this is in Britain's national interests. Whether it accords with British national dignity and self-respect is another matter. Carnegie does not take institutional positions on

public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees. PROGRAM RUSSIA AND EURASIA

The Russia and Eurasia Program continues Carnegie’s long tradition of independent research on major political, societal, and security trends in and U.S. policy toward a region that has been

upended by Russia’s war against Ukraine.  Leaders regularly turn to our work for clear-eyed, relevant analyses on the region to inform their policy decisions. Learn More